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The discussions concerning 'movement' and 'identity' often focus on potentially 
threatened identification processes. In contrast to this, there are ‚movement‘ 
situations in which identification is not necessarily experienced as problematic, 
but seems to become overall less relevant. In the case of foreign nationals living 
in Yogyakarta, Indonesia, movement is sometimes seen as a possibility for 
extending one's personality, rather than questioning it. 
 
This is made possible through the specific circumstances under which this kind 
of movement occurs. In the context of global political, economic and social 
inequalities, living in the 'gap' between their 'home' countries and the Indonesian 
setting, this existence gives rise to various economic and social gains. This 
situation seems to diminish the sense of urgency of identification processes, 
while at the same time producing a set of diverse affiliations, which also bring 
about changed notions of 'home'.  
Introduction 
Regarding the papers presented in this issue, and the tenets of the ‘movement’ literature in general, 
one feature emerges: the movements described often give rise to a exacerbated sense of ‘identity’, or 
identification, that is experienced as problematic by the individuals concerned. Whether it is 
developing new strategies as in the case of the German Turkish entrepreneurs in Berlin, or attempts 
to attain a ‘new’ identity as with the British in Andalucia, identification seems an issue that people 
struggle to come to terms with.  
In contrast to this, I would argue that movement can also impact on identification in a different way. It 
can make identification not a more, but a less salient issue.  In the case of foreigners (1) living in 
Java, I would maintain that their form of existence produces diverse, but loose, ways of identification. 
Along with these, go similarly altered notions of what constitutes ‘home’. I then argue that these 
affiliations have little of the urgency and anguish that often accompany processes of movement.  
Instead of ‘identity’, the notion of ‘home’ is more relevant for characterizing this ‘gap life’. But like 
‘identity’,  ‘home’ is often not seen as a problematic issue. The reason why it is a crucial concept for 
explaining gap life is that the altered, multiplied and diversified concepts of ‘home’ not only distinguish 
gap life, but make it possible in the first place. People can also afford to live in the gap because they 
operate from a secure ontological basis, which is partly sustained by these new notions of ‘home’. 
Thus, the changed sense of ‘home’ makes the existence of  ‘living in the gap’ possible.  
As specified below, the altered sense of ‘home’ characteristic of ‘living in the gap’ only holds for a very 
circumscribed group of individuals and situations.  Also, I do not mean to present this development as 
a redemptory one. It is enabled in the first place by economic and social inequalities. Thus, it also 
creates its own victims: people who cannot, or do not choose to, ‘live in the gap’, but rather are 
submerged by it.  In the following, I describe the ‘gap existence’, the gains resulting from it as well as 
the impact it has on notions of home and identity. On a concluding note, I point out some of its 
problematic aspects.  
The gap existence 
To explain how I encountered what I have called ‘gap life’, I need to put the following in context. This 
paper is based on ongoing fieldwork I have been conducting since September 1999 in Yogyakarta, 
Java, Indonesia.   The foreigners that I have looked at in Yogyakarta are mainly European and US-
American nationals. Yogyakarta doesn’t have a large ‘foreign’ population in numerical terms, as 
compared to Jakarta, but still a noticeable one. What marks foreigners living in Yogya is that they 
have not been posted there by companies from their ‘home’ countries; they have come to live there by 
their own initiative. While I refer to the former as ‘corporate expatriates’, foreigners in Yogya could be 
called ‘lifestyle expatriates’. 
Most Yogya foreigners engage in self-styled small-to-medium scale business enterprises, are 
employed in the teaching or cultural sector, work for non-governmental organisations, pursue their 
own projects in the arts or social work, study at one of the universities or simply come to live there 
without any income-generating activities. As private entrepreneurs, they concentrate on the 
production and export of furniture and handicrafts, or run tourism-related venues such as 
guesthouses, bars or restaurants. In the ‘cultural’ sector, English teaching is most prominent, next to 
French and German, and the local branches of cultural institutes also employ several foreign 
nationals. As Yogya is not an industrial center, there are few NGO -projects directly concerned with 
Yogya, but some maintain offices there and have volunteers working for them. Most characteristic for 
Yogya are the foreigners who are not directly engaged in ‘business’ actitivites, but in what I have 
called ‘personal projects’. These are often related to art or social work or simply consist of a lifestyle 
that allows them to pursue various personal interests.  
Compared to Jakarta expatriates, Yogya foreigners live in comparatively modest accomodation, which 
while more expensive than that of the average Yogya citizen is still cheaper than accomodation in 
their home country. What marks these foreigners specifically as part of a ‘transnational’ phenomenon 
are their movement patterns. In contrast to older foreigners, who often stayed in Indonesia for years 
at a stretch, these ‘lifestyle expats’ frequently move back and forth not only between Indonesia and 
their home countries, but also between other countries as well. In that sense, the situation in Yogya is 
characterized by a certain amount of ‘coming and going’ - people make frequent trips to Jakarta, 
Singapore or return to their ‘home’ countries for work, social or visa reasons. But this transience also 
bears its own sense of stability: usually people don’t leave for good, but maintain ties to Yogya while 
they are away, and return frequently to stay there. Another feature which is crucial for the notions of 
‘home’ is that they maintain close ties to their home countries, their friends and family there. Moving to 
Yogya in that sense is not seen as a decisive, final move, but rather a temporary choice which can be 
reconsidered and revoked if the need arises.  
In the process of encountering these foreigners, I was wondering mainly about two things: what made 
them come to Yogya, and what made them stay? What made people come there was quite often 
determined by accident. Most of them had come to Indonesia for the first time as tourists, or while 
visiting friends. Often they hadn’t even been especially interested in Indonesia as a country, but more 
or less chanced upon it as a travel destination. However, while visiting, and getting engaged with the 
place, they realized what lifestyle possibilities could open up for them there.  
Considering all this, it seemed to me that their lives could best be captured in the metaphor of ‘living 
in the gap’.  They were living ‘in’ the gap geographically and socially: moving back and forth between 
countries, but being neither completely part of one or the other society, or maybe a bit of both. 
Alternatively, one could describe the gap as a ‘third space’, one that is neither wholly home-country or 
Indonesian, but instead is constructed through the foreigners’ particular situation in Indonesia. This 
‘gap’ or third space is inhabited and continuously re-created by the foreigners. Living in the gap is 
made possible through differences between them and Indonesians. The ‘gap’ is a space opened up 
by these differences, and providing a habitat because of the gains arising from them.  
One of the things that makes foreigners stay in Yogya is the realisation that they can build an 
existence, not otherwise available to them, because of the economic and social differences between 
their home countries and Indonesia. Their greater economic power allows them to lead comparatively 
comfortable lives in Yogya, while the social and cultural differences provide a variety of professional 
possibilities and social and personal advantages which wouldn’t present themselves in their home 
countries.  
...and its gains 
these ‘gains’ or advantages share a basis in economic and social gradients between the foreigners 
‘home’ country and Indonesia. Usually it is the interaction and combination of several of them which 
provide advantages for foreigners. The existence of foreigners in Yogya is characterised by these 
differences between them and the Indonesians they encounter.  My argument is that, although these 
differences become relevant in multiple and ambiguous ways, they can provide advantages for the 
foreigners. One could also discuss the ways they disadvantage or limit them, but for the present case 
I focus on the favourable aspects. 
The easiest to recognize are probably the economic ones: the greater economic power of foreigners 
compared to most Yogya citizens provides them with a lifestyle often unavailable to them at home. 
Other advantages arise from what is perceived as ‘difference’ or ‘otherness’, or what is called the 
‘bonus of the exotic’.  These ‘social differences’ are a complex set of features that get played out in 
various ways. An important aspect that constitutes these social differences is the idea that ‘white’ 
Westerners, almost irrespective of nationality, are in certain ways considered superior to Javanese or 
Indonesians.  
The idea of superiority seems to be based on several aspects: greater political and economic 
power;  belonging to highly industrialized countries with ‘high technology’, a high standard of 
education, high standard of living, countries marked by effectivity, ‘hard work’ and success. This often 
seems the basis for the admiration of foreigners, it endows them with a certain prestige, and a great 
deal of attention, which invariably influences their everyday lives.  
At the same time, it is important to point out that foreigners are also considered inferior in many ways. 
For example, they lack Javanese social and cultural competence, spiritual awareness and morality; 
they lack restraint and politeness. They are sometimes regarded as ‘children’, who behave 
inappropriately but can’t be expected to know any better. Obviously there are a multitude of attitudes 
towards foreigners among Javanese, in the ‘superiority’ as well as in the ‘inferiority’, and various other 
discourses. Here I am focusing on the perceived superiority of foreigners, because its impact on 
foreigners’ lives is relevant in this context.  
Subsequently, one could ask how foreigners themselves relate to this situation. Again, there is a 
whole range of attitudes towards these issues. It seems that in many cases, the idea of superiority of 
foreigners as such is– -at least outwardly– rejected. What might sometimes be retained, or maybe 
reinforced, is the idea of  foreigners bearing valued qualities, such as inventiveness, organisational 
skills, long-term planning and the like. Often it is claimed that, while these differences supposedly 
exist, they don’t imply any further judgment. It was put by several people in a statement as: 
We are different, but not any better. 
which characterizes in a nutshell the mental attitude they ascribe to themselves. To what extent this 
reflects ‘political correctness’, rather than an actual persuasion, is of course not always evident. 
Social differences are not confined to increased social status, but can comprise a ‘better’ education 
and professional training, as well as personal skills and ‘intercultural knowledge’. For example, the 
ability to interact with both Indonesians and other foreigners in a way that is advantageous for them. 
These differences provide the foreigners with a range of benefits or ‘gains’.  
There are ‘professional gains’, such as foreigners being offered more professional possibilities than in 
a Western country, often combined with a higher income or increased living standard. It means that 
foreigners can obtain jobs they couldn’t at ‘home’. This holds especially for setting up business 
projects like furniture or handicraft production and export. Usually, the capital required to set up a 
business in Indonesia is much smaller than in Europe or the US, as is the business knowledge. Many 
of the small scale entrepreneurs have not run businesses at ‘home’, and didn’t necessarily have 
specific qualifications for it; still, they often succeed. This is partly due to the fact that: ‘in Indonesia, 
you can afford to make mistakes without losing your business immediately’, because, since 
operations are on a smaller financial scale, mistakes are less costly.  
A lot of foreigners’ success is due to structural advantages. As someone put it,‘to be successful in 
Europe, you need to be very smart. Here, you only need to be half-smart’. This is partly credited to the 
low competition from Indonesians in their specific sector, but also to their better starting position in 
terms of general education, as well as higher motivation and organizational and planning skills. These 
advantages also extend to foreigners holding a job in their original profession. As a business 
administration graduate put it, 
in Europe, there is lots of competition and all my friends have to work hard to be successful. Here in 
Indonesia, I have advantages from the start because of my better education and it is much easier for 
me to maintain a good position. 
Apart from the professional, there are social and personal gains. As I have mentioned above, 
foreigners can experience a gain in social status that functions as an ‘ego-boost’. This has several 
consequences; one is an apparent increase in one’s romantic and sexual attractiveness. As a 
foreigner, female or male, it is usually quite easy to establish a relationship with an Indonesian, if one 
wishes to do so. That this is also often to do with economic factors is obvious. Although these 
relationships get used in different ways by foreign men and women, there also seem to be a few 
similarities. One could argue that a relationship with an Indonesian often provides them with a degree 
of agency not available to them in relationships ‘at home’. For example, it seems that both foreign 
men and women often make efforts to ‘educate’ their partner– often in the form of providing them with 
language or university courses. This is not only ‘raising them to their level’, but sometimes also 
moulding them according to their ideas. Foreign women, in particular, frequently make efforts to 
increase the life possibilities for their partner– a situation that doesn’t occur that often in Western 
countries.  
Thus, I would argue that these relationships can provide agency for the foreign partners, and allow 
them to become ‘charge-taking benefactors’. One could speculate how this arises from current gender 
relations in Western societies: while men might feel the importance of their position as a provider has 
been declining, women might find there are too few possibilities to ‘take charge’ of their partners’ 
lives.  
Apart from these gains in relationships, there are also more ‘personal’ or individual gains. For 
example, especially with younger people, living in Indonesia is perceived as a chance for personal 
growth. As an English woman explained 
since my money goes so much further here, I can pursue my personal interests- like doing creative 
things, learning the language, etc– without having to do a shit job like I would have to in London. The 
pressure isn’t there, which gives me the time and space to think about things. 
In sum, it becomes clear that these gains originate from real or perceived differences and  inqualities, 
between foreigners and Indonesians. Foreigners realize that their ‘capital’– financial, social or 
cultural– yields much more profit in Indonesia. Thus, it seems that it is not only your money that goes 
further, but also your knowledge, efforts, and even personality. 
In what way does culture matter?  
As mentioned above, I initially assumed that foreigners might be drawn to Java because of its cultural 
heritage,  as in traditional music, dance or batik, or even by practices of Javanese mysticism. It can 
be argued, though, that Javanese ‘culture’ neither played a major role in attracting foreigners in the 
first place nor in their decision to stay there. As an American woman living in Yogya put it, 
Most of my friends here are not madly in love with Indonesian culture ...but you realize that your 
money goes so much further here, and it gives you the space to do things that you cannot do at 
home.  
Although culture was not the reason to come there, quite a few foreigners develop an acquaintance 
with ‘Javanese culture’ or society as they go along. A lot of the Yogya foreigners are quite fluent in 
Indonesian. They are often directly involved with Indonesians– at least in their work or projects– on a 
daily basis. Thus, they often acquire some ‘intercultural competence’, including knowledge about 
‘correct’ and effective interaction with Indonesians. This doesn’t necessarily imply a greater 
appreciation or understanding as such, but it is recognized as supporting their interests.  Many 
foreigners aim at maintaining good social relations with their Indonesian friends, colleagues and 
neighbours, and quite a few consider themselves to be fairly successful in this.  
One could ask in what way this particular situation– intercultural knowledge with a detached attitude– 
arises from or impacts on the foreigners’ senses of identification. Foreigners don’t necessarily 
immerse themselves in ‘Javanese’ society , but neither do they avert themselves from it out of a 
heightened sense of their ‘own’ (national) identity. Their identities seem to be neither challenged, nor 
reinforced, by their residence abroad. In the following, I will try to characterize this specific way of 
identification which might be charactistic of people living in the gap. 
Is identity an issue? 
I suggest that the motives behind why people choose to live in the ‘gap’ influences how they relate to 
Indonesia, to their ‘home’ country and how it in turn produces a diverse set of affiliations.  The gap 
situation is characterized by a decreased relevance of ‘national identification’. Being of a certain 
nationality is not denied or experienced as problematic. On the other hand, living in the gap doesn’t 
seem to intensify a sense of national identity either. Instead, I would argue, a sense of national 
identity is retained, but at a comparatively low level. It is not an issue that matters in everyday life; it 
becomes almost a casual fact.  
The taken for granted character of nationality is important because it goes against the assumption 
that living in a different country necessarily threatens one’s sense of identity. This doesn’t seem to be 
the case here. Rather, it seems that living in the gap is made possible precisely through an underlying 
secure sense of identity. One could even argue that living in Indonesia as a ‘white foreigner’ is 
unlikely to undermine one’s identity, but rather to reaffirm and reassure it. This might be not so much 
because of one’s status as a specific national or ‘white person’ (orang bule), but rather because of 
one’s position as a privileged, wealthy individual.  
But there are other aspects of why identity is not an issue. It is maybe brought about by the reasons 
that prompted people to choose a ‘gap life’ in the first place. Their decision to move is partly 
functional, in the sense that the reason to move is often the realization of the gains of a gap life. Thus, 
it is not an aversion to one’s passport country that made people leave,  but rather a vague 
dissatisfaction with the possibilities available. But the motivation isn’t a specific attachment to 
Indonesia either; there is a certain degree of arbitrariness in their move; it isn’t necessarily country– or 
‘culture’ specific. This lack of strong ‘identification’, with either country, could be characterized as 
detachment. But this doesn’t imply an attitude of indifference; it just generates a set of diverse and 
loose affilitations, as will be discussed below.  
Taking this into account, and referring back to the detached-retained sense of ‘national identity’, it 
appears that the concept of ‘identification’ is not the most appropiate one with respect to this type of 
movement. Instead, the concept of ‘home’ might be better suited to elucidate the nature of these 
diverse affiliations.  
Home is many spaces 
That the notion of  ‘home’ maybe more seminal in exploring the gap is also suggested by the fact that 
it gets discussed much more than ‘identity’. ‘Gap people’ seem to be more conscious of changing 
notions of home; there is often a realization that ‘home’ has multiple meanings for them. My argument 
is that the notion of home has undergone a fundamental diversification, as in the nature of what is 
considered ‘home’,  hence its description as ‘spaces’. This ongoing relevance of home, albeit in 
different forms, ties in with Rapport and Dawson’s claim that ‘the evidence points to a successful 
resilience of “home”’, even if people ‘refrain from finally and essentially affixing their identities to place’ 
(1998:32).  
In the case of living in the gap, this could be identified as a ‘double deterritorialization’. Home gets 
deterritorialized in the sense of a shift from home being one place to being many places. While ‘home’ 
used to refer to one specific geographic location, it can now denote several locations simultaneously. 
But secondly, home has also turned from referring to physical places to referring to social ‘spaces’, or 
even virtual ones.  
As far as the theoretical connections are concerned, one can argue that the emerging notions of 
home and the ‘gap life’ presuppose and reinforce each other at the same time. One can only ‘live in 
the gap’ comfortably if one is at ease with these diversified notions of home. But simultaneously, the 
practices of gap living also enact and further develop these notions.  
As an example, I quote a woman living in Yogyakarta, as she recounts her return to Yogyakarta after 
a ‘holiday’  in Germany:  
So when I went back, I first went to my parents’ place, because I had stored my things there. But 
none of my friends are left there any more. Then I went to Berlin, because my boyfriend lives there. 
And then I went to Hannover, where I worked and lived before coming to Indonesia, and where I still 
have a flat. But when I came back to Yogyakarta and turned into our driveway, I also felt like coming 
home.  
Although not all of the places one has been involved with over several years retain the same 
relevance, it becomes difficult to single out one place that is ‘home’. Instead, this is substituted by 
several places with different degrees and forms of attachment. Another woman, trying to define her 
‘home’, listed various places, and concluded: ‘well home is where my friends are’. Obviously, friends 
of ‘gap people’  are often scattered over several cities and countries as well. There can be clusters of 
friends in one city, while others are consistently spread out and moving themselves. It is, therefore, 
more appropriate to speak of social networks that are not defined locally. As a American based in 
Jakarta, but travelling a lot for his work put it: 
I can imagine living like this for a while...  I don’t mind the travelling as long as I have some sort of 
basis to go back to, like my flat in Jakarta at the moment. Next month I’ll have to go to Kuala Lumpur 
and Bangkok for work, but a lot of my friends live there, which is great. Really, I couldn’t survive such 
a lifestyle without this kind of network. 
This network can also include one’s family, which often remains a stable point of reference. Although 
sometimes, parents don’t live in the person’s passport country any more; in that case, ‘going home’ is 
even more difficult to define. Alternatively, people who have been moving a lot as a family declared 
that  ‘my family is my home– no matter where they happen to live at the moment’.  
Subsequently, for many people maintaining these networks means communicating with them via the 
Internet, or less frequently, by phone.  In any case, the importance of the Internet, and specifically 
email, can hardly be underestimated. It is not an additional feature to these lifestyles, but makes them 
possible in the first place. Since personal visits are still important, but are more difficult and less 
frequent, email is often the only way social relations and friendships are maintained over long time 
periods and geographical distances. As one individual put it,  
I always tell people my most permanent adress in the last couple of years has been my email adress, 
and that is kind of true. At the moment I am in Indonesia, but I might not stay here forever. But a lot of 
my friends are scattered like that, and we all keep in touch via email. I am at home where my email is, 
and hotmail doesn’t have a place...  
Looking at an email address as a notion of home, which has no specific physical place, but is 
theoretically accessible just about anywhere, one could say that email was the ultimate version of 
‘home’- completely deterritorialized, yet globally accessible and invariant to a person’s movements. 
So among the multitude of emerging notions of ‘home’, the notion of the internet as a ‘virtual home’ is 
probably one of the most significant developments.  
Looking at the connection between email and the ‘gap life’, one could argue that these are merely 
correlated phenomena that  occur simultaneously. It is possible to show, though, that there are 
substantial, causal links between the two. One point is that the ‘gap life’ doesn’t only lead to an 
intensified use of email, but in turn email makes ‘gap life’ easier in the first place. Email alleviates 
potential social losses and sufferings that occur during a prolonged stay abroad. While living in 
Indonesia, for example, is sometimes described as social hardship by an older generation, some of 
this gets relieved through the use of email. This doesn’t only hold for contact with friends and family, 
but also keeping in touch with ‘what is happening’ in one’s home country.  
In that sense, the internet fundamentally changes the experience of ‘living abroad’ and makes it less 
dramatic than for an older generation. For example, the older generation often speaks of ‘home’ as a 
loss; something that could not be retrieved and had to be given up during their stay in Indonesia. For 
those living in the ‘gap’, this doesn’t apply. They sustain their economic and social ties with their home 
countries over longer periods; frequent visits back as well as visits from friends and relatives help to 
ensure this. Through the internet, they also keep in closer contact than would have been possible 
some years ago. Although there might be a slight sense of alienation when going to their home 
country, ‘home’ has, for the gap generation, lost its sense of loss and suffering, to be replaced by a 
choice between multiple lifestyles.  
Gap life isn’t for everyone  
The literature on movement and globalisation often carries a sense of celebration and an attitude of 
‘everything is possible’. It is therefore important to point out some of its limitations which are often 
overlooked or played down.  For example, the ‘unlimited movement’ follows in fact quite specific 
patterns. The ‘gap’ doesn’t open up anywhere in the world; it depends upon economic and political 
power gradients, which (Western) people can use for creating a gap existence. It is limited to certain 
regions and within these, focused on specific places. In that sense, the possibilities for the ‘gap 
lifestyle’ are not global,  but quite circumscribed.  
Secondly, the ‘gap lifestyle’ isn’t open to anyone. Since it depends on the economic and social 
inequalities mentioned, it can only be experienced by a certain group of people like those from 
industrialized Western countries. Due to its exclusive nature, the ‘gap lifestyle’ is not a liberating 
development, but reproduces the inequalities it is based on. Most importantly, the gap situation 
reinforces the need to pay attention to the way social and material conditions constitute identity and 
gap life. Gap life can probably only be enjoyed by individuals with an assured sense of personal 
identification. As suggested earlier, it is often their material basis which endows foreigners with such a 
secure sense of identity. It is a useful reminder of the theoretical necessity of not separating the social 
and cultural aspects of movement from its economic ones. This seems important since in the 
discussions on migration and its effects on identification, the discursive and symbolic aspects of 
identity have often been foregrounded, while economic factors have received lass attention.  
Finally, ‘gap life’ also  points to the continuing relevance of social preconditions for 
identification.  While the individuals and situations I describe do not provoke anxiety, there are also 
materially well endowed individuals who technically live ‘in the gap’, but lack this secure sense of 
identity without which gap live can’t be appreciated. For them, the gap is not a desired ‘home’ but an 
uncomfortable limbo. This can be the case for example with ‘ethnic Indonesians’ who have lived 
abroad for a longer period of time and  then, through the ‘globalisation of markets’, return to their 
passport country Indonesia to work or live there as ‘expatriates’.  
This situation is sometimes experienced as quite difficult by them. While they might feel a much 
stronger sense of affiliation with the expatriate community of the country where they lived in 
previously, this feeling is not always reciprocated by the respective expatriates themselves. In some 
cases, though, this rejection isn’t necessarily expressed by expatriates, but exists merely as an 
underlying fear of the ‘Indonesian’ individuals themselves, which only exacerbates the situation.  At 
the same time, while they might feel drawn to, but rejected by, the expatriate community, these ‘ethnic 
Indonesians’ are often not considered ‘real Indonesians’ any more by their Indonesian relatives or 
acquaintances. They are sometimes regarded as too ‘westernized’ and not belonging to the ‘real 
Indonesian’ community any more either. So these individuals might seek close affiliations, but are 
frequently denied them. In that sense, the gap lifestyle is reserved for people who are in a position to 
choose– places of residence as well as social and cultural affiliations.  
Note  
1. I use the term ‘foreigners’ here rather than ‘expatriates’ because it seems less restrictive. Although 
‘foreigner’ can denote any non-Indonesian national, I have focused on ‘foreigners’ from Western 
industrialized contexts, such as the US and Europe.  
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